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INTRODUCTION
American democracy is under siege. This is so because of the confluence
of three trends: (1) demographic change and residential segregation, which
increasingly have placed more racially diverse Democratic Party voters in
cities and suburbs, while rural areas have become more white and
Republican; (2) a constitutional structure—particularly the Electoral
College, the composition of the Senate, and the use of small, winner-take-all
legislative districts—that gives disproportionate representation to rural
populations; and (3) the willingness of this rural Republican minority to use
its disproportionate power to further entrench counter-majoritarian
structures, whether through extreme partisan gerrymandering, increased
voter suppression efforts, court-packing, or outright rebellion against the
results of democratic elections.
These three trends together pose an existential threat to the whole idea
of democratic self-governance. Indeed, the very viability of the Republican
Party as a national political force now depends almost completely on countermajoritarian structures. Democrats have won the popular vote in seven of
the past eight presidential elections1 and easily won the popular vote in the
2020 election by more than seven million votes.2 Yet, Donald Trump came
within 45,000 votes in three states from winning the Electoral College
*
**
***
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Walter S. Cox Professor of Law, The George Washington University.
Law Clerk, U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.
Redistricting Counsel, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund.
See Nicholas Riccardi, Democrats Keep Winning the Popular Vote. That Worries Them., AP NEWS (Nov.
14, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/democrats-popular-vote-wind6331f7e8b51d52582bb2d60e2a007ec (“Democrats won the popular vote in this year’s
presidential election yet again, marking seven out of eight straight presidential elections that the
party has reached that milestone.”).
See Drew Desilver, Biden’s Victory Another Example of How Electoral College Wins Are Bigger Than Popular
Vote Ones, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2020/12/11/bidens-victory-another-example-of-how-electoral-college-wins-are-biggerthan-popular-vote-ones/ [https://perma.cc/5X2B-DUHF] (“Biden received. . . more than 7
million more votes than Trump.”).
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anyway.3 In the Senate, the 50 Republican Senators collectively received
41.5 million votes fewer than the 50 Democratic Senators,4 and a vote in
Wyoming is worth over three times more than a vote in California in the
Electoral College.5 Further, one demographic study predicts that by 2040,
70% of the population will reside in only fifteen states, which will permit only
30% of the population to elect 70 out of the 100 senators.6 Meanwhile, for
the first time in U.S. history, four of the current U.S. Supreme Court justices
were appointed by presidents who did not win the popular vote and a
controlling majority were confirmed by Senators who themselves did not
represent a majority of the popular votes cast for Senate.7 Finally,
Republicans are using gerrymandered majorities in state legislatures to
create new rules making it harder to vote,8 to restrict the use of popular
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The three states are Wisconsin, Georgia, and Arizona. Elaine Kamarck & John Hudack, How to
Get Rid of the Electoral College, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
fixgov/2020/12/09/how-to-get-rid-of-the-electoral-college/ [https://perma.cc/7EAP-RLGD].
See Ian Millhiser, America’s Anti-Democratic Senate, by the Numbers, VOX (Nov. 6, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/2020/11/6/21550979/senate-malapportionment-20-million-democratsrepublicans-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/9GWV-6SF5] (“If the two Georgia seats go to
Democrats, the Senate will be split 50–50, but the Democratic half will represent 41,549,808
more people than the Republican half.”).
Representation in the Electoral College: How do States Compare?, USAFACTS (Aug. 13, 2020),
https://usafacts.org/visualizations/electoral-college-states-representation/
[https://perma.cc/M9MP-KG7R] (“One way to think about electoral representation is to
consider how many people each electoral vote represents, based on a state’s population.
According to 2018 population estimates, one electoral vote in Wyoming accounts for around
193,000 people, while a vote in Texas or California accounts for over 700,000.”).
UNIV. OF VA. WELDON COOPER CTR. FOR PUB. SERV., DEMOGRAPHICS RSCH. GRP., National
Populations Projections (2018), https://demographics.coopercenter.org/national-populationprojections [https://perma.cc/4EFR-GV4P]; Philip Bump, In About 20 Years, Half the Population
Will Live in Eight States, WASH. POST (July 12, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/07/12/in-about-20-years-half-thepopulation-will-live-in-eight-states/ [https://perma.cc/4UXT-UPD4] (“[B]y 2040 or so, 70
percent of Americans will live in 15 states. Meaning 30 percent will choose 70 senators.”).
See Adam Cole, The Supreme Court is About to Hit an Undemocratic Milestone, VOX (Sept. 28, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/21456620/supreme-court-scotus-undemocratic-milestone-minority-rule
(“For the first time since senators were directly elected, a controlling majority of the Court will
have been put there by senators whom most voters didn’t choose. (And, of course, the last three
will have been nominated by a president who lost the popular vote by nearly 3 million votes.).”).
See Alex Tausanovitch & Danielle Root, How Partisan Gerrymandering Limits Voting Rights, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (July 8, 2020), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/partisangerrymandering-limits-voting-rights/ [https://perma.cc/DVN2-QGZ2] (“[S]tate legislators who
won their elections due to gerrymandering are making it harder for Americans to vote.”).
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referenda,9 to place election administration in the hands of political
partisans,10 to allow the legislature to ignore the vote count altogether,11 and
to change state court elections so that judges are elected based on legislative
district so as to extend Republican gerrymandered advantages to judicial
elections as well.12
Thus, we face the very real prospect that for the foreseeable future a
mostly white rural Republican minority wields disproportionate, structurally
locked-in, power over a more diverse urban and suburban Democratic
majority.13 A democracy cannot survive long under those conditions.
9

10

11

12

13

Popular initiatives are also referred to as ballot initiatives and referenda, among others. See, e.g.,
Reid Wilson, GOP Targets Ballot Initiatives After Progressive Wins, THE HILL (Feb. 20, 2021),
https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/539654-gop-targets-ballot-initiatives-afterprogressive-wins [https://perma.cc/UT2V-7XFU] (referring to popular initiatives as “ballot
initiatives” and “referenda”).
See, e.g., Quinn Scanlan, 10 New State Laws Shift Power Over Elections to Partisan Entities, ABC NEWS
(Aug. 16, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dozen-state-laws-shift-power-elections-partisanentities/story?id=79408455 [https://perma.cc/UK5P-YF3S] (identifying “at least eight states,
including battlegrounds Arizona and Georgia, that have enacted 10 laws so far this year that change
election laws by bolstering partisan entities' power over the process or shifting election-related
responsibilities from secretaries of state”).
See Matt Vasilogambros & Ethan Edward Coston, Contentious Fringe Legal Theory Could Reshape State
Election Laws, PEW (Mar. 18, 2022), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2022/03/18/contentious-fringe-legal-theory-could-reshape-stateelection-laws [https://perma.cc/KMJ5-VW63].
See Patrick Berry, The Wrong Way to Reform Judicial Elections, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb. 7,
2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/wrong-way-reform-judicialelections [https://perma.cc/W975-XF3B] (“The bill, H.B. 196, would have voters elect supreme
court justices to 10-year terms by district rather than statewide.”).
Data from the last two decades shows that the Democratic Party maintains a wide and longstanding advantage among Black, Hispanic and Asian American registered voters. See Trends in
Party Affiliation Among Demographic Groups: Continuing Racial and Ethnic Divisions in Leaned Partisan
Identification, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/03
/20/1-trends-in-party-affiliation-among-demographic-groups/2_3-14/
[https://perma.cc/3DNZ-PFZB] (displaying statistic on which political party is most popular
among various demographic groups). National exit polling data tells a similar story, with a
majority of white voters consistently favoring Republican candidates in presidential elections over
the last 40 years, while Black voters have solidly supported the Democratic contenders. See Ruth
Igielnik & Abby Budiman, The Changing Racial and Ethnic Composition of the U.S. Electorate, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Sept. 23, 2020), https://www.pewresearch.org/2020/09/23/the-changing-racialand-ethnic-composition-of-the-u-s-electorate/ [https://perma.cc/YS3P-C8KJ] (“[T]he
Democratic Party maintains a wide and long-standing advantage among Black, Hispanic, and
Asian American registered voters. Among White voters, the partisan balance has been generally
stable over the past decade, with the Republican Party holding a slight advantage.”). Hispanic
voters have also historically been more likely to support Democrats than Republican candidates,
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Indeed, it is perhaps not surprising that Republicans appear to be less and
less committed to majoritarian democracy altogether.14
In order to rescue the possibility of democratic self-government, we need
an all-hands-on-deck response, and part of that response relies on the
judiciary. In particular, we argue that both state and federal judges must
begin to apply heightened scrutiny to legislation or executive action that seeks
to entrench the political power of a rural electoral minority or that
discriminates against urban and suburban populations. Such legislative and
executive action defiles the democracy and impedes political participation by
locking in the power of a minority faction of the country.
This Article therefore makes the case for heightened judicial scrutiny in
order to protect democratic processes against partisan and discriminatory
entrenchment. In making this argument, we seek to revive the political
process rationale for heightened judicial scrutiny that has long been
associated with constitutional scholar John Hart Ely and his interpretation of
Chief Justice Stone’s famous footnote 4 of the decision in United States v.
Carolene Products Company.15 Ely’s Democracy and Distrust16 is rightly considered

14
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though their support has not been as consistent as that of Black voters. See id. (“Black voters have
solidly supported the Democratic contenders. Hispanic voters have also historically been more
likely to support Democrats than Republican candidates, though their support has not been as
consistent as that of Black voters.”).
See Zack Beauchamp, The Republican Revolt Against Democracy, Explained in 13 Charts, VOX (Mar. 1,
2021), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22274429/republicans-anti-democracy-13charts [https://perma.cc/734Y-XFCJ] (“The Republican Party is the biggest threat to American
democracy today. It is a radical, obstructionist faction that has become hostile to the most basic
democratic norm: that the other side should get to wield power when it wins elections.”).
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938):
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such
as those of the first ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be
embraced within the Fourteenth. It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of
legislation. Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities, whether prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry
(internal citations omitted).
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
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one of the classics of twentieth century jurisprudence.17 Starting from this
footnote in an otherwise unremarkable Supreme Court decision, Ely built “a
participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial
review.”18 His approach provided a convincing answer to the so-called
“counter-majoritarian difficulty”19 inherent in having unelected judges
overturn legislation and executive action initiated by democratically elected
government officials. According to Ely, judicial review could actually
enhance, rather than supplant, democratic decision making if courts
intervene particularly “when the political process is undeserving of trust or
judicial deference.”20 Thus, he focused on judicial review in cases when
either “(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure
that they will stay in and the outs will stay out” or “(2) though no one is
actually denied a voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an effective
majority are systematically disadvantaging some minority out of simple
hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and
thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other groups by a
representative system.”21 Scholars have labelled these two justifications for
judicial intervention “an antientrenchment and an antidiscrimination
rationale” for heightened judicial scrutiny.22
Both Chief Justice Stone, in Carolene Products, and Ely, in Democracy and
Distrust, were particularly focused on the potential ways the political system
was skewed to deny Black people effective political representation, as well as
the many circumstances through which de jure racial discrimination denied
racial minorities equal rights. But there is no reason that the Carolene Products
theory as elaborated by Ely needs to be confined only to this context. To the
contrary, the whole point of Ely’s theory of judicial review is that it
contemplates judicial intervention whenever the prevailing political system is
systematically disadvantaging one group in order to lock in political
advantages to another group. In such circumstances the democratic process
17

18
19
20
21
22

See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, The Coherentism of Democracy and Distrust, 114 YALE L.J. 1237 (2005)
(“A quarter of a century after its publication, Democracy and Distrust remains the single most
perceptive justificatory account of the work of the Warren Court and arguably of modern
constitutional law more broadly.”).
ELY, supra note 16, at 87.
304 U.S. 144 (1938).
Kathleen M. Sullivan & Pamela S. Karlan, The Elysian Fields of the Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 695,
697 (2004).
ELY, supra note 16, at 103.
Sullivan & Karlan, supra note 20, at 697.
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is not functioning properly, and judicial intervention is not a threat to
democracy, but a necessity in order to preserve democracy.
In this article, we argue that our current political moment calls for a
robust application of the Carolene/Ely principles of judicial review because we
are facing precisely the sort of entrenched power problem that Ely argued
was a core rationale for strict scrutiny by judges. Indeed, in this case the need
for judicial scrutiny is arguably even stronger because this entrenched power
is not being wielded by the majority against a “discrete and insular”
minority.23 Instead, it is an electoral minority that is seeking to lock in its power
against an urban and suburban majority.24 Accordingly, it is even more
important that heightened judicial review be applied to prevent countermajoritarian gambits from undermining democratic self-government
altogether.
This counter-majoritarian entrenchment, because it disadvantages urban
populations, also works to disadvantage and disenfranchise communities of
color, implicating Ely’s discrimination concern as well. Most of America’s
population resides in urban centers in just over a dozen states. Currently,
population growth in urban centers is overwhelmingly powered by millennial
Black and brown Americans.25 At 44% diversity, millennials are the most
ethnically diverse generation in American history.26 By the mid-2040s, racial
and ethnic minorities are projected to make up over half of all Americans
and a significantly larger share of America’s urban residents.27 Despite their
growing numbers—numbers that are even larger than official census figures
capture28—these urban voters face structural impediments to effectuating
their relative political power.
23

24

25
26
27
28

United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also William H. Frey, The
Millennial Generation: A Demographic Bridge to America’s Diverse Future, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/2018-jan_brookingsmetro_millennials-a-demographic-bridge-to-americas-diverse-future.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q98B-FNU5] (discussing the increasing size of the diverse millennial
generation as a percentage of the population as a whole).
For a comprehensive discussion of the roots and causes of this problem, along with comparisons
to other democracies around the world, see generally JONATHAN A. RODDEN, WHY CITIES
LOSE: THE DEEP ROOTS OF THE URBAN-RURAL POLITICAL DIVIDE (2019).
Frey, supra note 23.
Id.
Id.
See Tara Bahrampour, 2020 Census Undercounted Latinos, Blacks, Native Americans, Bureau Estimates Show,
WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2022), https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2022/03/10/2020census-undercount-report/ [https://perma.cc/6Z48-EZQC].
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Of course, some elements that contribute to this anti-democratic state of
affairs are beyond the capacity of the judiciary to remedy because, for
example, some reforms would require a constitutional amendment or a
change to the structure of the judiciary itself.29 However, the state and
federal judiciary can play a significant role in policing harmful consequences
of this structural counter-majoritarianism. In particular, we argue that when
an Executive without a popular mandate or a legislature that does not reflect
the majority of citizens enacts policies or laws that target and disadvantage
the very populations that are being structurally denied their ability to
participate in the political process, those policies or laws should be subject to
heightened scrutiny.30 In this article we provide examples of such situations
where heightened judicial review is appropriate. We also discuss a pernicious
theory—recently entertained by four U.S. Supreme Court justices—that
would allow gerrymandered state legislatures to enact rules further
disenfranchising voters or even changing election results without being

29

30

Alicia Bannon & Zachary Laub, Court Reform Gets New Attention: Controversy Surrounding Judicial
Nominations Has Pushed Questions about the Federal Courts’ Structure and Powers onto the Agenda, BRENNAN
CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 30, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/researchreports/court-reform-gets-new-attention [https://perma.cc/HB9D-H77M].
U.S. CONST amend. XIV (“No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”); U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”). Although the Fourteenth Amendment, by its terms, applies only
to the states, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly applied the principles of equal protection
contained in the Amendment against the federal government as well, through the so-called “reverse
incorporation” doctrine. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (stating that “it would
be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government”
than it does on a State to afford equal protection of the laws). Likewise, the heightened scrutiny
called for in Carolene Products has frequently been used to strike down federal governmental action.
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 216–17 (1995) (summarizing cases); see
also Kenneth Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541, 554
(1977) (“In case after case, [F]ifth [A]mendment equal protection problems are discussed on the
assumption that [F]ourteenth [A]mendment precedents are controlling.”). Even those who resist
the incorporation doctrine of Bolling tend to recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantee should still apply to the federal government through the Amendment’s
Citizenship Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“All persons born and naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and the state wherein
they reside.”). See, e.g., United States v. Vaello Madero, 142 S. Ct. 1539, 1547 (2022) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he Citizenship Clause could provide a firmer foundation for Bolling’s result than
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”); see also Ryan C. Williams, Originalism and the Other
Desegregation Decision, 99 VA. L. REV. 493, 501 (2013) (arguing that the Citizenship Clause “was
adopted against a longstanding political and legal tradition that closely associated the status of
‘citizenship’ with the entitlement to legal equality”).
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constrained by state or federal constitutional limitations. This so-called
“independent state legislature” theory represents the worst sort of textual
literalism, unmoored from context, historical understanding, or
constitutional structure. It is also contrary to recent U.S. Supreme Court
precedent and requires precisely the opposite reading of state and federal
constitutional rights that we pursue here.
Part Two of this Article summarizes the heightened scrutiny rationale
articulated by Ely, building from the Carolene Products footnote of Chief Justice
Stone; it also tackles criticisms of Ely’s theory and argues that even if those
criticisms might be valid in general, they do not apply to the sorts of legislative
and executive acts targeted in this Article. Part Three argues that heightened
scrutiny should apply to laws and policies that disfavor urban and suburban
voters, because such voters constitute discrete and insular populations facing
structural, locked-in barriers to effectuate repeal of legislative and executive
policies that harm them. Part Four examines categories of laws that weaken
the political power of urban residents and that should therefore draw strict
judicial scrutiny. This section goes on to propose measures to ensure
heightened scrutiny is applied only in circumstances truly warranting judicial
review and intervention, guided by relevant U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence and general principles of constitutional law. Finally, this Part
uses the democracy-protecting approach advocated in this Article to criticize
the “independent state legislature” theory because it would allow minority
factions to further disenfranchise the majority of the population by severely
reducing, if not eliminating, the possibility for meaningful judicial review by
state or federal courts.
I. THE RATIONALE FOR HEIGHTENED JUDICIAL SCRUTINY TO PROTECT
DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES
As noted in the Introduction, Ely built his approach to judicial review
from footnote four in United States v. Carolene Products, a footnote that
constitutes the “first—and maybe only—attempt to say, systematically, when
the courts should declare laws unconstitutional.”31 In Carolene Products the
Court ruled that although the federal Filled Milk Act was likely a
protectionist concession to the condensed milk industry, the Court would
nevertheless let the act stand. According to Chief Justice Stone, it was not
31

David A. Strauss, Is Carolene Products Obsolete?, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1251, 1254.
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the Court’s role to reexamine economic legislation passed by Congress and
therefore such legislation need only have a rational basis.32 However, Stone
then dropped his famous footnote, in which the Court described a variety of
cases in which this presumption of constitutionality would not apply: (1) laws
that violated the clear command of a specific prohibition in the Constitution,
such as those in the Bill of Rights; (2) laws restricting political processes that
can bring about repeal of unpopular legislation; or (3) laws that disadvantage
particular religious or national minorities or reflect “prejudice against insular
and discrete minorities.”33 For these categories of laws, judges should
provide careful review to ensure that the proper conditions for democracy
are in place: (1) the rule of law, (2) formal access to democratic processes, and
(3) adequate and non-dismissive representation of out-groups by elected
representatives.34
Thus, the Court, responding to criticism of the activist decisions that
marked the so-called Lochner era,35 made clear that most regulatory activities
should be left to the politically elected branches of government.36 Crucially,
bad policy judgments or misguided regulatory aims would not be sufficient
to justify court intervention in legislative or executive branch action because
state legislatures, governors, Congress, and the President are the ones
responsible for deciding contentious policy issues. Thus, the footnote sought
to overcome the concern that courts might thwart democracy and the will of
the people.37
Nevertheless, the footnote deliberately sought to preserve areas where the
courts would be justified to intervene. And though misguided policy choices
would not be sufficient, failures in the political process itself could justify court
action. In particular, courts could step in when defects in the political process
prevent its functioning so that the views of all are incorporated.38

32
33

34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 1252–1253 (citing United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938)).
William N. Eskridge Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes
of Politics, 114 YALE L.J., 1279, 1281 (2005) (citing United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938)).
Id. (citing ELY, supra note 16, at 73–77, 87–103).
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (ruling that a state minimum hour law violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by interfering with freedom of contract).
See Strauss, supra note 31, at 1254.
See id.
See id. at 1254 (citing Felix Gilman, The Famous Footnote Four: A History of the Carolene Products
Footnote, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 163, 176–79 (2004)).
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Significantly, although the first exception in the footnote focuses on
potential violations of fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, the
second and third exceptions are process-based justifications that define the
scope of judicial review not in terms of the value of specific rights, but rather
by their susceptibility to abuse of power by factions.39 The second
justification responds to the concern that representatives in political office
may conspire to entrench themselves, and by doing so defeat the democratic
processes that presumably makes the acts of legislatures more valid than acts
of judges in the first place.40 Thus, Chief Justice Stone wrote that “more
exacting judicial scrutiny” would be applied to “legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation.”41 Examples of such legislation in the
footnote include restrictions on voting, on dissemination of information, on
political organization, and on peaceable assembly.42 The point, however, is
that incumbents should not be allowed to control the apparatus of politics in
order to keep others perpetually out.43 And while the political process is
usually self-correcting because bad laws will lead to backlash, if people are
not allowed to vote, or hear information, or organize in opposition to policies,
the self-correcting process fails.44 Indeed, as Robert Cover has pointed out,
the footnote was written in 1938, when authoritarian governments abroad
were deliberately locking certain populations out of majoritarian processes.45
In response, the heightened scrutiny articulated in Carolene Products envisions
courts acting only to eliminate political blockage, ensuring that judicial
review enhances, rather than undermines, democratic governance.46
While exception two is about the twisting of democratic government to
entrench power, exception three focuses on what constitutes a legitimate
democratic purpose.47 In particular, it identifies discrimination against racial

39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287
1292 (1982) (“The second and third paragraphs of the footnote accept the general terms of the
counter-majoritarian difficulty, extending the scope of judicial review not in terms of the special
value of certain rights but of their vulnerability to perversions by the majoritarian process.”).
Id. at 1292.
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
Id.
Cover, supra note 39, at 1293.
Strauss, supra note 31, at 1257–58.
Cover, supra note 39, at 1293–94.
Strauss, supra note 31, at 1256.
Cover, supra note 39, at 1294.
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minorities as a pitfall of pure majoritarian rule that was apparent in 1938.48
Discrete and insular minorities are often not only perpetual losers in the
political process, but also scapegoats and the objects of prejudice.49
Minorities are discrete when they are identifiable in some way that makes it
easier to single them out.50 Insular means that other groups interact with
them less and are therefore less willing to form coalitions with them due to
prejudice.51 Their insularity makes them less understood and therefore easier
to target, and the political processes do not work for them.52 Footnote four
supplies two reasons for protection of minorities. First, discrete and insular
minorities cannot expect that majority-controlled politics will protect them
as it protects others.53 Second, prejudice and hatred are political levers in
politics that tend to keep racial minorities locked out because racial
demagoguery is often politically effective.54 Thus, the footnote seeks to
distinguish these types of minorities, who are structurally locked out of the
process because of discrimination, from ordinary losers in the political
process. After all, one of the key lessons of the Lochner era was that there are
legitimate winners and losers in a democracy, and the losers should not rely
on courts to reverse their losses. So, if the manufacturers of filled milk cannot
organize to defeat legislation that harms them, that is simply majoritarian
democracy in operation.55 But if democracy cannot work because of
structural discrimination in the political process itself, then heightened
scrutiny is democracy-reinforcing.
In elaborating on Carolene Products’ footnote four, Ely starts from the
premise that the Constitution was designed to be fully representative.56
Quoting Federalist No. 39, Ely notes that it is “essential to [self-]government
that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an
inconsiderable proportion, or a favored class of it . . . .”57 And Federalist No.
57 eloquently elaborates:

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 1296.
Strauss, supra note 31, at 1257.
Id.
Id.
Cover, supra note 39, at 1296.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Strauss, supra note 31, at 1257.
ELY, supra note 16, at 5.
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Who are to be the electors of the federal representatives? Not the rich, more
than the poor; not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs
of distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and
unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of the people of
the United States. They are to be the same who exercise the right in every
State of electing the corresponding branch of the legislature of the State.58

Of course, the Constitution at the founding emphatically did not live up
to this lofty ideal, most obviously excluding Blacks and women from political
participation. However, Ely pointed out that the constitutional trajectory
has been towards expanding the scope of such participation: “[e]xcluding the
Eighteenth and Twenty-First Amendments—the latter repealed the
former—six of our last ten constitutional amendments have been concerned
precisely with increasing popular control of our government.”59 And five of
those six specifically extended the right to vote.60 According to Ely, “[o]ur
constitutional development over the past century therefore has substantially
strengthened the original commitment to increasing popular control of the
majority of those governed.”61
In such a system, Ely acknowledged, we must be careful not to overinflate the role of judges because there is no assurance that they will share
the values of the majority of society and their life tenure insulates them from
popular influence.62 Thus, having justices make the majority of value-laden
judgments is at odds with our carefully wrought constitutional design, which
gives control to the people.
Nevertheless, seizing on the Carolene Products footnote, Ely succinctly
explained the rationale for a more active role in certain areas:
Paragraph two suggests that it is an appropriate function of the Court to keep
the machinery of democratic government running as it should, to make sure
the channels of political participation and communication are kept open.63
Paragraph three meanwhile mandates that the Court should also concern
itself with what majorities do to minorities, particularly in passing laws
‘directed at’ religious national, and racial minorities and those infected with
prejudice against them.64
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Id. at 76.
Id. at 76.

778

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 24:4

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause provides the
most obvious constitutional grounding for Ely’s process-based understanding
of judicial review.65 But Ely also found support for his process theory in the
Privileges and Immunities Clause,66 which has been interpreted to forbid
states from treating out-of-state residents worse than they treat their own
residents.67 According to Ely, states are not able to discriminate against nonresidents precisely because such non-residents are a politically “powerless
class.”68 Likewise, in the context of the so-called Dormant Commerce
Clause, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state cannot “subject goods
produced out of state to taxes it did not impose on goods produced locally.”69
Again, the idea is to bind the interests of out-of-state manufacturers to those
of local manufacturers represented in the legislature, in order to protect those
politically powerless out-of-state manufacturers.70 Finally, Ely cited the five
constitutional amendments in the twentieth century specifically expanding
the right to vote.71 The Seventeenth provided for the direct election of
Senators.72 The Twenty-Fourth abolished the poll tax.73 The Nineteenth
extended the vote to women.74 The Twenty-Third allowed D.C. residents
to vote.75 And the Twenty-Seventh allowed eighteen-year-old people the
right to vote.76 Extending the franchise to protect populations from being
locked out of the political process has therefore, according to Ely, been a
dominant trend in constitutional law.77 Thus, he argued, the character of
the Constitution has been to make sure that the making of significant
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decisions is open to all and that lawmakers take into account the interests of
all when making laws that affect everyone.78
The U.S. Supreme Court has at least at times applied the Carolene Products
approach to strike down laws that impact democratic participation. As Chief
Justice Warren made clear, writing for the Court in Kramer v. Union Free School
District No. 15,
[W]hen we are reviewing statutes which deny some residents the right to
vote, the general presumption of constitutionality afforded state statutes and
the traditional approval given state classifications if the Court can conceive
of a rational basis for the distinctions are not applicable . . . . The
presumption of constitutionality and the approval given “rational”
classifications in other types of enactments are based on an assumption that
the institutions of state government are structured so as to fairly represent all
the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a
challenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the
basis for presuming constitutionality.79

Using a similar rationale, the Court has also intervened in cases involving
voter qualifications because the “ins” cannot be trusted to decide who stays
out in these cases.80 Thus, in Carrington v. Rash, the Court invalidated a law
denying the franchise to those who moved into the state on military service.81
And in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court struck down Virginia’s
poll tax.82 In both cases, the Court labeled the laws in question irrational,
but in neither case was that actually true. After all, as Ely noted, military
personnel do tend to move around more than others and may have less
commitment to local politics.83 Likewise, it is not completely irrational to
think requiring people to pay in order to vote will tend to select for more
informed and committed voters.84 The real problem with both of these laws,
according to Ely, was that they interfered with the democratic process itself,
choking off the voice of disadvantaged groups.85 Similarly, the one-person,
one-vote standard of Reynolds v. Sims aims to ensure that the in-group cannot
thwart political participation by devaluing the votes of opposing factions.86
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Both Ely’s democracy-protecting theory of judicial review and the
Carolene Products’ tiers-of-scrutiny approach have been subjected to criticism
from both the left and the right. In particular, critics worry that the focus on
“discrete and insular minorities” has no obvious limiting principle. For
example, Laurence Tribe argues that one cannot escape the need to make
judgments about which groups deserve protection under a process approach,
and such a judgment inevitably reflects substantive values.87 After all, Tribe
contends, how do we differentiate arsonists (who presumably do not deserve
special judicial solicitude) from, say, homosexuals (who might)?88 Relatedly,
some worry that determining who counts as a relevant minority group
“requires the Justices to be, in a sense, amateur political scientists.”89 Indeed,
some political theory suggests that discrete and insular groups might actually
be more successful in getting their preferences enacted into law because they
do not have the free-rider or collective action problems that large and diffuse
majorities face.90 In addition, as Richard Posner has argued, the focus on
democratic participation will always necessarily be underinclusive because
people may wield more political influence for other reasons, such as wealth,
age, education, influence in their social circles, and so on.91 And of course
anyone who lives in a district where one political party has little or no chance
of winning is effectively powerless.92 Thus, Posner argues that simply fixing
certain types of democratic participation will not sufficiently remedy all
disparities of power.93 Finally, some conservatives have argued that even if
there might once have been a need for courts to intervene to remedy systemic
imbalances of political power, that time has passed. Most famously, Justice
Scalia flipped the Carolene Products rationale on its head in the affirmative
87
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See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J.
1063, 1072 (1980); see also MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 83 (1988) (raising a similar concern).
Gilman, supra note 38, at 176 (citing Tribe, supra note 87, at 1075).
Strauss, supra note 31, at 1265.
Richard A. Posner, Democracy and Distrust Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 641, 646 (1991); see also Bruce
A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L REV. 713, 723–24 (1985) (“Other things being
equal, ‘discreteness and insularity’ will normally be a source of enormous bargaining advantage,
not disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist American politics. Except for special cases, the
concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges to protect groups that possess the opposite
characteristic from the ones Carolene emphasizes—groups that are ‘anonymous and diffuse’ rather
than ‘discrete and insular.’”).
Posner, supra note 90, at 648.
Id.
Id.
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action context, arguing that well-organized powerful liberal interest groups
had instituted policies to help racial minorities at the expense of “unknown,
unaffluent, unorganized” whites.94 Nevertheless, his critique simply suggests
that conservative jurists have not abandoned the idea that judges owe
heightened scrutiny to those locked out of the democratic process; they just
disagree as to who is being locked out. Similarly, Justice Thomas, in his
dissent in Kelo v. New London, cited the footnote for the proposition that those
disadvantaged by the Court’s expansive definition of public use in the
Takings Clause would be poor communities that are least powerful.95
Indeed, he went so far as to say, “If ever there were a justification for intrusive
judicial review of constitutional provisions that protect ‘insular and discrete
minorities’ surely that principle would apply with great force to the powerless
groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects.”96 Thus, even
conservative jurists have deployed Ely’s democracy-protecting approach.
Moreover, whatever the merits of these various criticisms might be in
general, they do not apply to the current counter-majoritarian entrenchment
to which this Article is addressed. For example, although it is true that
determining which minority groups deserve judicial attention under Ely’s
framework can be difficult, in the case of disempowered urban and suburban
populations, we are not even talking about a minority group at all, but rather
an electoral majority that is being systematically undermined and denied full
democratic participation. Courts need not be amateur political scientists to
see that urban citizens are disadvantaged; the data is clear and unambiguous.
As a result, the potentially difficult line-drawing problems are irrelevant here.
In addition, this urban/suburban majority, precisely because it is a majority
and therefore large and diverse, faces serious collective action obstacles. And
even if it did not, this majority still cannot wield its appropriate share of
power because of structural barriers that simply prevent the majority from
gaining power in anything even close to proportion with its number.
Likewise, contrary to Posner’s argument, in this case even if urban and
suburban majorities do wield power in other ways—for example, through
greater wealth—that power still runs up against structural barriers that, for
example, are likely to deprive that majority of its appropriate share of power
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Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 521–22.
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in the Senate no matter how much wealth it controls. Finally, Justice Scalia’s
affirmative action concern does not apply because here we are focusing not
on providing an extra benefit to urban and suburban populations, but simply
applying heightened scrutiny to legislative and executive actions that target
them unfairly or discriminate against them.
Of course, there are other theories of democracy beyond Ely’s. For
example, Ronald Dworkin’s moral reading of the U.S. Constitution requires
government to treat each citizen with equal concern or respect.97 But
significantly, like Ely’s process theory, Dworkin’s approach is aimed at
explaining why majorities should not be able to run roughshod over
minorities. The problem of U.S. democracy right now and for the
foreseeable future, however, does not implicate this fundamental twentieth
century problem of judicial protection of minorities against majorities.
Instead, we now have an entrenched electoral minority wielding structurally
locked-in power at the expense of the majority. And no plausible theory of
democracy can justify that sort of entrenched power. So, if urban/suburban
electoral majorities were ever actually to wield power commensurate with
their voting strength, then of course Ely’s (or Dworkin’s) theory would
require that the majority could not discriminate against rural minorities or
lock them out of power. But we are nowhere near that problem currently,
and the structural advantages that rural populations already enjoy in the U.S.
constitutional system renders such a concern largely theoretical. Instead, we
must treat urban and suburban majorities as a discrete and insular group
structurally locked out of power and discriminated against by rural
minorities. Accordingly, the question becomes how heightened scrutiny
might apply to executive and legislative action that disadvantages urban and
suburban populations.
II. URBAN AND SUBURBAN VOTERS AS A DISCRETE AND INSULAR
STRUCTURALLY DISEMPOWERED MAJORITY
A. The New Demographic and Ideological Reality
Urban voters today face structural impediments to collective action partly
because of the Constitution’s division of power between the federal
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government and the States, but also because of years of partisan
gerrymandering, racialized federal housing policies, globalization, and
climate change. By 2040, about 70% of Americans are expected to live in
the 15 largest states.98 That means that the vast majority of Americans will
have a mere “30 senators representing them, while the remaining 30% of
Americans will have 70 senators representing them.”99 Two decades from
now, nine states100 will be home to half of the country’s population, but
represented by less than a quarter of the Senate.101 Without the possibility
of translating this political power into a majority in the Senate, urban voters
will become more politically crippled as time passes, even as the proportion
of Americans who are urban voters swells. Commitment to federalism or a
republican form of government is an empty response to the demographic
reality facing America over two centuries after the country’s founding.
In addition, urban counties in the United States are increasingly majority
minority, meaning non-white Americans command a majority there, while
non-Hispanic white Americans command a majority in rural counties.102
And while urban and suburban areas are growing rapidly, rural counties
have made only minimal population gains since 2000, as the number of
people leaving for cities and suburbs has outpaced the number of people
moving into rural ones.103 Adults in urban counties, long aligned with the
Democratic Party, have moved even more to the left in recent years, and
today twice as many urban voters identify as Democrats or lean Democratic
as affiliate with the Republican Party.104 Further, Republican efforts to
minimize the political power of urban centers and their residents comes
precisely as these centers are becoming increasingly diverse and have been
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coupled with xenophobic immigration policies and rhetoric regarding the
role of immigrants in American society.105
As these centers become home to the majority of the American
population, questions about the Constitution’s requirement that the Senate
be composed of two Senators from each State with one vote each,106 have
been raised with more frequency and increasing alarm.107 Giving each state
an equal share of representatives irrespective of the relative population in
that state has for several decades skewed the political power of rural counties
in the country, rural counties that are overwhelmingly composed of white
Americans who consistently prefer Republican candidates.
Although nationally non-Hispanic white Americans are the majority, this
group is a rapidly shrinking percentage of the American population writ
large.108 By 2050, non-Hispanic white Americans are expected to represent
less than half of the U.S. population, as other ethnic groups grow more
rapidly. Importantly, non-Hispanic white Americans have been a minority
in most urban counties since 2000, while remaining the majority in 89% of
rural ones.109
Urban, suburban, and rural residents have radically different social and
political opinions, specifically on issues of race, immigration, same-sex
marriage, abortion, and the role of government.110 Unsurprisingly, rural
residents are increasingly right-leaning in their political ideology. Over half,
(54%) of all rural voters now identify with or lean to the Republican Party,
while a shrinking share (38%) lean or identify with the Democratic Party.111
Rural residents are far more likely than suburban or urban residents to say
that they believe all or most of their neighbors are the same race or ethnicity
as they are (69% vs. 53% and 43%, respectively).112 In contrast, urban
residents tend to actually value living in a jurisdiction that is racially and
ethnically diverse, far more than rural residents: “[Seventy percent] of city
dwellers say this is very or somewhat important to them, compared with a
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narrower majority of those in suburbs (59%) and about half in rural areas
(52%).”113
During the Trump Administration, antagonistic policies towards urban
centers carried a particularly blatant anti-immigrant message. The
Administration (and Trump himself) repeatedly and falsely linked crimes
committed by immigrants both to states with “green light” laws that allow
immigrants to obtain a state issued driver’s license without a social security
number, and to urban centers with “sanctuary”114 policies that limit
cooperation with the national government to enforce federal immigration
edicts.115 Trump also attempted to use an Executive Order to coerce
sanctuary jurisdictions to adopt his Administration’s anti-immigrant
enforcement policy by conditioning a jurisdiction’s receipt of federal funds
on its willingness to comply with the federal government with regard to
immigration enforcement.116 The Ninth Circuit, however, found the
executive branch could not create a new condition of federal funding
whereby the government withholds, terminates, or reduces funding based on
a jurisdiction’s sanctuary laws and that these sanctuary laws did not conflict
with the President’s Executive Order.117
Later, however, in a bid to win re-election, Trump and U.S. Attorney
General William Barr escalated their battle with urban jurisdictions
providing sanctuary to immigrants by announcing, among other things,
lawsuits against the state of New Jersey, as well as the county encompassing
Seattle, Washington. According to Barr, “in various jurisdictions, so-called
‘progressive’ politicians are jeopardizing the public’s safety by putting the
interests of criminal aliens before those of law-abiding citizens.”118 And in
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his State of the Union address, Trump decried the state of California’s
sanctuary policy, calling the state “a sanctuary for criminal illegal
immigrants—a very terrible sanctuary—with catastrophic results.”119
Meanwhile, after the New York legislature decided to allow
undocumented persons to apply for a driver’s license and refused to turn over
this license information to any agency that “primarily enforces immigration
law,” the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) issued a policy
revoking New York residents’ ability to enroll or re-enroll in any Trusted
Traveler Program, including Global Entry, SENTRI (Secure Electronic
Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection), NEXUS, and FAST (Free and
Secure Trade). This executive action contradicted prior congressionally
passed legislation, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, which encouraged DHS to establish an international registered
traveler program for use by all states and territories of the United States,
flowing in part from bi-partisan recommendations from the 9/11
Commission Report. This coercion ultimately prevailed, however: The
New York legislature amended its “Green Light Law” to allow for
information-sharing of NY motor vehicle records “as necessary for an
individual seeking acceptance into a trusted traveler program, or to facilitate
vehicle imports and/or exports.”120 In the same vein, the U.S. Justice
Department under Barr sued New York City because of the jurisdiction’s
decision not to comply with several ICE subpoenas, as part of his effort to
circumvent the city’s decision not to provide information to the federal
government for the purpose of immigration enforcement. Similar subpoenas
were also issued to Denver, Colorado for the same purpose.
Federal efforts to target urban centers escalated at the end of the Trump
presidency, as the Administration stepped up its executive actions against socalled sanctuary jurisdictions. At Trump’s behest, DHS also erected
billboards, funded with taxpayer dollars, in so-called sanctuary jurisdictions
ahead of the 2020 presidential election, depicting immigrants charged with,
but not convicted of, crimes ranging from public intoxication and disorderly
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conduct to more serious assault charges.121 The signs showed the mug shots
of immigrants alongside the crimes for which they were charged above text
stating that “Sanctuary Policies are a REAL DANGER.”122
These claims about increased crime were patently false and simply served
to underscore the intent and purpose of anti-urban laws and policies—to
disenfranchise and discriminate against urban jurisdictions whose residents
are increasingly immigrants and non-white Americans. First, the data is
clear—jurisdictions with sanctuary policies have statistically significant lower
crime rates than non-sanctuary jurisdictions.123 Second, the economies of
sanctuary jurisdictions are stronger than non-sanctuary jurisdictions—
sanctuary jurisdictions have a higher median household income, less poverty
and less reliance on public assistance, higher labor-force participation, and a
higher employment-to-population ratio than non-sanctuary jurisdictions.124
Third, sanctuary policies have wide-spread public support: A 2017 study
reports that sanctuary jurisdictions account for over 92% of the total U.S.
population.125 Finally, and unsurprisingly, sanctuary jurisdictions account
for 92.2% of the total U.S. population and about 95.3% of the total foreignborn population in the United States.126
The increasing demographic sorting of America into diverse Democraticleaning urban and suburban areas and increasingly white Republicanleaning rural areas would not be problematic if Republicans were committed
to majoritarian democracy. If they were, then Democrats would be expected
to hold the overall balance of power based on their numbers, with
Republicans retaining a substantial enough minority to prevent the most
extreme Democratic initiatives. In this scenario, the courts could intervene
simply to prevent the Democratic majority from running roughshod over
core rights of Republican areas of the country and to ensure equal
participation in voting.
121
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But alas, that is not the reality we see. Instead, by nearly every measure
Republicans are becoming less committed to democracy or even the idea
that an electoral majority should be allowed to govern legitimately. Indeed,
the pervasive fact-free challenges to the 2020 presidential election suggest
that Republicans for the foreseeable future will be unwilling to accept the
outcome of any election that they lose. For example, a recent University of
Washington study of strong Trump supporters found not only near
unanimous belief that the 2020 election was stolen, but over 90% oppose
making it easier to vote.127 A separate study found that nearly 40% of
Republicans favored violent resistance to elected leaders if those leaders were
not sufficiently defending America,128 and a February 2021 survey indicates
that nearly 60% of Republicans see Democrats as the “enemy,” as opposed
to simply the “political opposition.”129
Finally, a detailed study by Vanderbilt professor Larry Bartels shows that
substantial numbers of Republicans endorse statements contemplating
violations of key democratic norms, including respect for the law and for the
outcomes of elections and eschewing the use of force in pursuit of political
ends.130 Moreover, Bartels’ data shows that “the strongest predictor by far
of these antidemocratic attitudes is ethnic antagonism—especially concerns
about the political power and claims on government resources of immigrants,
African-Americans, and Latinos.”131 Thus, Bartels concludes that “[t]he
strong tendency of ethnocentric Republicans to countenance violence and
lawlessness, even prospectively and hypothetically, underlines the
significance of ethnic conflict in contemporary U.S. politics.”132
For all of these reasons, it seems clear that as urban and suburban areas
grow increasingly diverse and increasingly Democratic, Republicans will see
the voting power of these regions as less and less legitimate. As a result, they
will see nothing wrong with systematically disenfranchising urban and
suburban populations, which they will view as synonymous with
disenfranchising non-white populations. Thus, both Ely’s entrenchment and
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discrimination concerns are implicated, justifying heightened judicial review
of such efforts.
B. The Disempowerment of Urban and Suburban Populations
To demonstrate the consequences of urban disenfranchisement, consider
the following examples.
Over the last several decades, as a result of frequent, deadly and highly
publicized instances of gun violence across the country, particularly in
American schools, support for gun safety laws has increased across the
partisan divide. Today, an overwhelming majority of Americans favor
stricter gun laws, despite their inability to effectuate this desire into
legislation. In September 2019, the Pew Research Center found that 88%
of all Americans support requiring background checks for all gun sales (not
just the federally mandated background checks required only at a licensed
gun dealer), 71% support banning high-capacity ammunition rounds, and
69% support banning assault weapons.133 Gun violence, however, does not
affect all Americans equally; young people and communities of color—
groups that are disproportionately more likely to live in urban areas and vote
Democratic—account for a larger percentage of gun-related deaths per
capita.134
At the national level, meaningful gun safety reform has failed, despite
numerous attempts to pass both houses of Congress. And although
significant progress towards greater gun safety has occurred in some states,
progress has not been equal across the country, particularly in states whose
districts have been heavily gerrymandered to favor Republican candidates.
For example, despite strong public support for increased gun safety, the
legislatures of North Carolina, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin have
refused to enact popular gun safety measures.135 Indeed, the trend in
Republican-controlled states is to move in the opposite direction, as state
133

134

135

Katherine Schaeffer, Share of Americans Who Favor Stricter Gun Laws Has Increased Since 2017, PEW
RSCH. CTR. (Oct. 16, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/10/16/share-ofamericans-who-favor-stricter-gun-laws-has-increased-since-2017/ [https://perma.cc/J23H72KA].
Alex Tausanovitch et al., How Partisan Gerrymandering Prevents Legislative Action on Gun Violence, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/
reports/2019/12/17/478718/partisan-gerrymandering-prevents-legislative-action-gun-violence/
[https://perma.cc/7ZYY-72PL].
Id.
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after state is allowing concealed weapons without even a permit
requirement.136 Many of these states, whose legislatures are controlled by
Republicans as a result of partisan gerrymandering despite a majority of
state-wide voters supporting the Democratic Party, likely would have enacted
stronger gun safety measures but for this partisan gerrymandering designed
to deny effective representation to urban and suburban Democratic voters.
Another stark example of urban disenfranchisement was the concerted
effort of Republican lawmakers to reduce the availability of voting, other
than in-person, in urban centers during the 2020 presidential election. The
COVID-19 pandemic made in-person voting particularly dangerous or
deadly for certain voters and their families.137 As a result, some states
increased voters’ access to ballot drop-boxes, recognizing that many voters
were hesitant to put their ballots in the mail, that severe and unpredictable
postal service delays had resulted from the pandemic, and that widespread
in-person voting posed a public-health risk.138 In Texas, where urban centers
are increasingly populated by Black and brown voters who have trended
Democratic, Republican Governor Greg Abbott attempted to mitigate the
effect of these votes on the overall sway of the state by issuing a directive
limiting ballot drop-boxes to one per county.139 This was particularly
detrimental to voters in Harris County, home to Houston, which has a
population of more than 4.7 million people over 1,777 square miles, and
increasingly trends toward Democratic candidates.140 Three other states
136

137

138

139

140

Matt Vasilogambros, No Permit No Problem: More States Allow Residents to Carry a Hidden Gun, PEW
STATELINE (Dec. 6, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/
2021/12/06/no-permit-no-problem-more-states-allow-residents-to-carry-a-hidden-gun
[https://perma.cc/6324-W66W].
See, e.g., Kirk Johnson & Campbell Robertson, Coronavirus and 2020 Elections: What Happens to Voting
in an Outbreak, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 12, 2020) (“In-person voting could present numerous ways for
the virus to spread, experts say.”) https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/09/us/virus-electionvoting.html [https://perma.cc/KA3H-FJVH].
See also Voters Should Be Able to Return Absentee Ballots to Polling Places, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.
(Sept. 10, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/voters-should-beable-return-absentee-ballots-polling-places [https://perma.cc/B359-TMMA].
See Tex. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136, 137 (5th Cir. 2020)
(holding that Texas Governor Abbott’s Executive Order limiting ballot drop-off locations to one
per county, irrespective of how large or populous, did not violate the First and Fourteenth
Amendment because Texas had generally expanded remote voting opportunities as compared to
available pre-COVID procedures).
Elaine Povich, Rise in Use of Ballot Drop Boxes Sparks Partisan Battles, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/rise-in-
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controlled by Republican lawmakers—Mississippi, Tennessee and
Missouri—did not allow voters to drop off their ballots in person by any
means, despite the pandemic.
Likewise, in Pennsylvania, Trump’s reelection campaign, the Republican
National Committee, and Republican congressional candidates and electors
challenged the state’s use of ballot drop-boxes for absentee voting during the
COVID-19 pandemic,141 claiming that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had misinterpreted the scope and purpose of aspects of the state election
code.142 The case also highlighted a number of other Republican efforts to
suppress the vote in urban counties amongst disadvantaged residents in
Pennsylvania.143
In neighboring Ohio, Republican Secretary of State Frank LaRose
promulgated Directive 2020-16, specifically limiting the number of secure
drop-boxes available for the 2020 presidential election to a single drop-box
per county, irrespective of county size. Needless to say, any directive like this
that is uniform by county, regardless of size, will impact urban areas far more.
Although a federal district court halted the enforcement of LaRose’s directive
after finding that the law placed a significant burden on the right to vote
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Sixth Circuit stayed the
district court’s preliminary injunction.144
In Louisiana, Secretary of State Kyle Ardoin interpreted Louisiana law
governing the return of absentee ballots restrictively to ensure that only a
limited number of locations were available to voters to drop off their absentee
ballots in the November 2020 presidential election. Specifically, the New
Orleans City Council sought to increase the number of curbside drop-off
locations in the city, but Ardoin claimed that Louisiana Code Section

141
142
143

144

use-of-ballot-drop-boxes-sparks-partisan-battles-magazine2020.aspx [https://perma.cc/6ADX8XFB].
Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, 493 F. Supp. 3d 331 (W.D. Pa. 2020).
Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345 (Pa. 2020).
In particular, the lawsuit took aim at county procedures for allowing individuals whose ballots had
been flagged as potentially containing a signature mismatch—procedural defects that rarely
reflect an actual signature mismatch and more often affect Black and brown voters—to “cure”
these errors by substantiating their ballot with other personally identifying information. Id. at
348.
A. Philip Randolph Inst. v. LaRose, 493 F. Supp. 3d 596 (N.D. Ohio 2020) (granting preliminary
injunction to enjoin enforcement of rule finding the directive placed a significant burden on the
right to vote in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendment), appeal dismissed, 2020 WL
7980224 (6th Cir. 2020).
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18:1308(B)145 requires ballots be dropped off at a registrar’s office, and as a
result the city was not allowed to add additional curbside drop-off locations
beyond those associated with a registrar’s office, despite the increased volume
of absentee ballots requested as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. The
New Orleans City Council eventually sued the Louisiana Secretary of State
in state court for what it called an “unnecessarily restrictive” interpretation
of Louisiana law.146 In a letter to the Secretary, the Council stated,
We see nothing [in Section 18:1308(B)] that mandates delivery to the
physical business office of the Registrar or prohibits deputy registrars from
accepting ballots at multiple locations. [Indeed, Section 18:1308(B)] does
not use the word ‘office’ at all. Rather, it requires only that an absentee
ballot be delivered into the custody of the registrar or one of her deputies.”147

The letter was signed by all seven members of the New Orleans City
Council. The council later dropped its request for preliminary injunctive
relief.148 As a result, additional curbside drop-off locations were not available
during the November 2020 election. The Secretary’s policy was particularly
detrimental in the city of New Orleans, which, like the three other major
cities in the state, including Baton Rouge and Shreveport, is majority-

145

146

147

148

LA. STAT. ANN. § 18:1308(B) (2021) states,
The ballot shall be marked as provided in R.S. 18:1310 and returned to the registrar by
the United States Postal Service, a commercial courier, or hand delivery. If delivered by
other than the voter, a commercial courier, or the United States Postal Service, the
registrar shall require that the person making such delivery sign a statement, prepared by
the secretary of state, certifying that he has the authorization and consent of the voter to
hand deliver the marked ballot. For purposes of this Subsection, ‘commercial courier’ shall
have the same meaning as provided in R.S. 13:3204(D). No person except the immediate
family of the voter, as defined in this Code, shall hand deliver more than one marked ballot
to the registrar. Upon its receipt, the registrar shall post the name and precinct of the voter
as required by R.S. 18:1311.
Verified Pet. for TRO, Preliminary Inj., Permanent Inj., and Declaratory J., Council of New
Orleans v. Ardoin, No. 2020-08772 (Civ. Dist. Ct. Parish of Orleans Oct. 14, 2020); Danny
Monteverde, N.O. City Council to Consider Suing La. Secretary of State Over Ballot Drop-Off Dispute,
EYEWITNESS NEWS (Oct. 13, 2020), https://www.wwltv.com/article/news/local/no-citycouncil-to-consider-suing-la-secretary-of-state-over-ballot-drop-off-dispute/289-3e3147b3-5aa143bb-885d-27e51e0264a6 [https://perma.cc/E4KJ-NJ4Z].
Danny Monteverde, City Council Calls on Sec. of State to Allow More Drop-Off Points for Absentee Ballots,
EYEWITNESS NEWS (Oct. 10, 2020), https://www.wwltv.com/article/news/local/orleans/citycouncil-calls-on-sec-of-state-to-allow-more-drop-off-points-for-absentee-ballots/289-2e1d01dd2488-4ccc-baf9-01b97a90a170 [https://perma.cc/E4KJ-NJ4Z].
Press Release, ACLU of La., ACLU of Louisiana Asks Orleans Court to Stop Secretary of State
from Blocking Ballot Drop-Off Sites (Oct. 22, 2020), https://www.laaclu.org/en/pressreleases/aclu-louisiana-asks-orleans-court-stop-secretary-state-blocking-ballot-drop-sites
[https://perma.cc/5PV4-D5FX].
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minority. Indeed, 59.5% of the city of New Orleans is Black.149 Likewise,
Baton Rouge’s population is 54.7% Black,150 and Shreveport’s population is
57.1% Black.151 Statewide, however, Black Americans represent only 32.8%
of the state’s population.152 By limiting the number of curbside drop-off
locations to registrar’s offices, Ardoin guaranteed that urban centers
generally, and Black Americans specifically, in the state would bear the brunt
of the policy’s effects.
In congressional legislation, urban disenfranchisement is perhaps even
more stark and blatantly partisan. For example, the Republican-backed tax
code revisions of 2017153 capped state and local income tax deductibility
against the federal income tax at $10,000, which specifically targeted uppermiddle-class taxpayers in states with relatively high state and local income
taxes.154 Those states include New York, Connecticut, New Jersey,
California, Massachusetts, Illinois, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
All of those states have solid Democratic majorities, and not one has a
Republican Senator.155 Needless to say, this provision could only be enacted
because both houses of Congress were controlled by Republicans and the
President himself was a Republican, despite the fact that neither the
Republicans in the House, Senate, nor the White House represented
majorities of the actual people who voted.

149
150

151
152
153
154

155

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, New Orleans City, Louisiana (Jul. 1, 2021), https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/neworleanscitylouisiana/PST045219 [https://perma.cc/53X3-BA2M].
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Baton Rouge City, Louisiana (Jul. 1, 2021), https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/batonrougecitylouisiana,LA/PST045219? [https://perma.cc/ESK2GVQP].
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Shreveport, Louisiana (Jul. 1, 2021), https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/shreveportcitylouisiana [https://perma.cc/LU4D-ZAQA].
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Louisiana (Jul. 1, 2021), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/LA
[https://perma.cc/R882-TJCL].
Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2504.
Michael C. Dorf, The New Tax Plan Punishes Blue States: Is That Constitutional?, JUSTIA (Dec. 27,
2017), https://verdict.justia.com/2017/12/27/new-tax-law-punishes-blue-states-constitutional
[https://perma.cc/XN49-A6P2].
Id.
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III. THE NEED FOR HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY TO COMBAT EXECUTIVE
AND LEGISLATIVE ACTS DISADVANTAGING URBAN AND SUBURBAN
POPULATIONS
Courts, empowered by the Fourteenth Amendment, are uniquely
positioned to protect the rights of disadvantaged groups when those rights
are infringed upon by a political process that imposes higher obstacles for
certain classes of persons to engage in that process. For example, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held in Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1 that the
Fourteenth Amendment does not tolerate “a political structure that treats all
individuals as equals . . . yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in
such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of minority groups to
achieve beneficial legislation.”156 Such restructuring, the Court explained in
Hunter v. Erickson, “is no more permissible than denying [the minority] the
[right to] vote, on an equal basis with others.”157 In both of those cases, the
Court explicitly recognized the Ely/Carolene political process justification for
heightened scrutiny: When the majority reconfigures the political process in
a manner that burdens only a racial minority, that alteration triggers strict
judicial scrutiny.158 This doctrine continues to provide an enduring rationale
for the Court’s place in the democratic process and could go a long way
towards reviving the Court’s image as a non-partisan and critical player in
upholding democracy more generally. This is especially true when it is a
white rural minority faction that is entrenching its power in order to
disempower an increasingly diverse urban and suburban majority.
A. The Feasibility of Heightened Scrutiny
One might be concerned about undue judicial entanglement with the
political process if judges were to review every piece of legislation that had
disproportionate impact on urban populations. After all, any legislation
involves tradeoffs, and there will be winners and losers. For example, tax

156
157
158

458 U.S. 457, 467 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
Schuette v. Coal. Def. Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 342 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“While our Constitution does not guarantee minority groups victory in the political process, it
does guarantee them meaningful and equal access to that process. It guarantees that the majority
may not win by stacking the political process against minority groups permanently, forcing the
minority alone to surmount unique obstacles in pursuit of its goals—here, educational diversity
that cannot reasonably be accomplished through race-neutral measures.”).
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incentives for installing solar panels disproportionately benefit states with
more land and sun, and tax changes resulting in increased tax deductions for
dependent children benefit Utah more than other states because Utah’s
Latter-Day Saint community has more children than other communities.159
Nevertheless, the quest for a workable limiting principle is not
insurmountable. This limiting principle hinges on invidious motivation.160
And inquiries based on motivation are widespread throughout a variety of
different constitutional doctrines. Most obviously, in assessing claims of race
discrimination, the U.S. Supreme Court has frequently been called upon to
determine whether a legislature acted with constitutionally forbidden
discriminatory intent,161 or if a particular legislature demonstrated animus
towards an identifiable group of people,162 or if a legislature had the
predominant goal of creating voting districts to dilute the power of racial
minorities.163 These cases provide guideposts for courts to determine
whether a law discriminates on the basis of urban residence.
To take a recent example of judicial search for invidious motive, in
Common Cause v. Rucho164 the District Court established the elements of an
equal protection partisan gerrymandering claim as (1) discriminatory intent,
(2) discriminatory effect, and (3) the lack of a legitimate or neutral
explanation, and the court used these three factors to reject the state’s
election map as “diluted on the basis of invidious partisanship.”165 The court
reasoned that when legislative district lines are drawn to subordinate
members of one political party and entrench a rival party, it strikes at the
heart of the constitutional principle that elected officials cannot enact laws
that distort the marketplace of ideas so as to intentionally favor particular

159

160
161
162

163
164
165

Morgan Jacobsen, Economists: Large Families Are an ‘Ace in the Hole’ for Utah’s Economy, DESERET
NEWS (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.deseretnews.com/article/865651145/Economists-Largefamilies-are-an-ace-in-the-hole-for-Utahs-economy.html [https://perma.cc/K85K-G4XF].
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally Forbidden Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 523, 526
(2016).
See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996); see also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.
744, 771–75 (2013) (striking down a federal statute that had the principal purpose of imposing
inequality).
See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 959 (1996) (plurality opinion); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S.
900, 916 (1995).
318 F. Supp. 3d 777, 860–68 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
Id. at 827.
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political beliefs, parties, or candidates while disfavoring others.166 The
Republican-controlled North Carolina General Assembly expressly directed
the legislators and consultant responsible for drawing the 2016 election map
to rely on “political data” from past election cycles—specifying the extent to
which particular voting districts had historically favored Republican or
Democratic candidates—to draw a districting plan that would ensure
Republican candidates would prevail in the vast majority of congressional
districts.167 This scheme resulted in Republican candidates prevailing by safe
margins in the overwhelming majority of the State’s thirteen districts.168 The
court held that a plaintiff need not show that an invidious discriminatory
purpose be express, and such purpose can therefore be inferred based on the
totality of relevant facts.169 Although, as discussed below, the U.S. Supreme
Court ultimately overturned this decision based on an erroneous application
of the political question doctrine, the lower court decision provides a
trenchant example of how motivation cases can be pleaded and proved.
Judicial decision-making based on invidious motivation is not limited to
race-based cases, however. For example, the Court in American Party of Texas
v. White had no difficulty wading into an inquiry about invidious motivation
in upholding various Texas laws requiring smaller political parties to use a
nominating convention rather than a primary against a claim that such laws
“invidiously discriminated against new and minority political parties, as well
as independent candidates.”170 Likewise, in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Company, the Court considered whether a provision in the Illinois
Constitution that subjected corporations and other entities, but not
individuals, to a specific personal property tax violated the Equal Protection
Clause.171 In that case, the Court adeptly assessed whether the difference in
treatment was the result of “invidious discrimination.”172 And in Levy v.
Louisiana, the Court used the same approach to find that a Louisiana law that
discriminated between children born in wedlock and those children that the
166
167
168
169
170

171
172

Id. at 800.
Id. at 801.
Id.
Id. at 861–62.
415 U.S. 767, 771 (1974) (“At least where, as here, the political parties had access to the entire
electorate and an opportunity to commit voters on primary day, we see nothing invidious in
disqualifying those who have voted at a party primary from signing petitions for another party
seeking ballot position for its candidates for the same offices.”).
410 U.S. 356 (1973).
Id. at 359–65.
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state considered “illegitimate” evinced invidious discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.173
Beyond its Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence, the U.S. Supreme
Court has struck down statutes as running afoul of the Establishment Clause
when they are motivated by the impermissible goal of promoting religion.174
Likewise, the Free Exercise Clause requires strict scrutiny of laws that are
motivated by animosity to a particular religion or to religion more
generally.175 In the abortion context, the Court has ruled that regulations on
abortion violate due process if their “purpose . . . is to place a substantial
obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains
viability.”176 Regulatory statutes under the so-called Dormant Commerce
Clause incur strict scrutiny when they evince a protectionist purpose.177 The
Court has also used forbidden purpose as a reason for striking down
interferences with the right to travel.178
These sorts of tests could certainly be applied to legislative or executive
action that targets urban and suburban populations. Consider the
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement Agency under President Trump,
which decided to single out urban Democratic areas for deportation raids
under the pretext that sanctuary city policies imperil public safety by

173
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176
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391 U.S. 68 (1968).
See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“In the absence of precisely stated
constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines with reference to the three main evils against
which the Establishment Clause was intended to afford protection: ‘sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.’” (quoting Walz v. Tax
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970))
See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (“Official
action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere
compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality.”).
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454–55 (1992) (“[T]he Commerce Clause
prohibits economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.” (quoting New Energy Co. v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269, 273 (1968)).
See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 415 U.S. 250, 263–64 (1974) (striking down as a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause an Arizona law that required a year’s residence in a county in order
to receive nonemergency hospitalization at the county’s expense, because the law creates an
invidious classification impinging on the right of interstate travel by denying newcomers basic
necessities of life).
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shielding dangerous criminal immigrants.179 As a result of these raids,
thousands of urban dwellers were rounded up, and families were torn
apart.180 Such action could be challenged (though the invidious motivation
would need to be weighed against the traditional deference owed to the
executive in the immigration context). In addition, if Congress passed
legislation that targeted sanctuary cities, the Court could review such
legislation under heightened scrutiny. And if there were evidence that an
intended purpose of the policy was to target urban, heavily Democratic areas,
that could certainly be used to show pretext.
Likewise, if Congress passed legislation requiring that the next census
questionnaire ask about citizenship status, the law might receive heightened
judicial scrutiny because, among other possible constitutional infirmities, the
inclusion of such a question would adversely affect the size of the
congressional delegations with large urban populations, such as California,
New York, Illinois, and Massachusetts.181 Such a move probably does not
have a benign motive that can be ascertained, and a court could examine for
pretext.182 It is important to stress that by doing so, the court would be
enhancing, not undermining, democracy. Indeed, an important element of our
democracy is common community affiliation. If each legislator in Congress
acts only with an eye towards benefitting those who voted for her, then
American democracy will not survive. Moreover, it is clear that democratic
checks against such parochialism are insufficient due to demographic sorting,
gerrymandering, and institutional structures that dilute the power of urban
voters. Thus, heightened judicial scrutiny is necessary.
Finally, to return to our example of the cap on state and local tax
deductions, the question becomes whether the choice to limit the deduction,
which clearly disfavors taxpayers in Democratic states with large expensive
urban areas, was the result of an illicit motive. Certainly, there are legitimate
non-political rationales for capping state and local tax deductions. For
example, a resident of a low-tax state is required to pay for services that her
179

180
181

182

Tanvi Misra, The Stark Geography of U.S. Immigration Raids, CITYLAB (Oct. 25, 2018, 5:10 PM),
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/10/where-ice-immigration-raids-areconcentrated/573883/ [https://perma.cc/2TPA-7XUQ].
Id.
Paula Dwyer, Trump’s War Against Blue States, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 21, 2018, 4:00
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-21/trump-s-war-against-blue-states
[https://perma.cc/2VMC-UD34].
Id.
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state does not provide out of after-tax income, but until the recent tax change
the resident of a high-tax state was getting a federal subsidy for state and local
taxation that went towards funding the government-provided services in her
state. This might potentially provide a legitimate justification for the tax
change, but in reality higher-tax states generally contribute far more to the
federal government than they recoup from federal investment in the state,
while the opposite is true for low-tax states.183 Indeed, low-tax states may be
able to keep their state taxes low precisely because they receive subsidies from
the federal government and therefore do not need high local taxes to pay for
services. Thus, this justification is almost surely pretextual and would
therefore fail to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny.
If one is concerned that every economic regulation would then be subject
to strict scrutiny, a further limiting principle might be that aggressive judicial
scrutiny will only be deployed in cases where one group is advantaged and
the other disadvantaged, such as the tax plan, rather than a discretionary
benefit being conferred to one group to bring everyone up to the same level,
such as broadband subsidies to rural locales. The subset of legislation and
executive action that deliberately favors rural voters over urban voters would
be a limited and manageable set, not a roving mandate for the judiciary to
return to the days of Lochner, when judges struck down economic regulation
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because such
regulation was deemed to violate freedom of contract.
To be sure, it is often difficult to know whether a motive is benign or
illicit. But difficulty in determining motive should not relieve judges of their
role in subjecting to strict scrutiny legislation that disproportionately favors
particular populations over others. And, as mentioned above, these
challenges have been overcome in myriad contexts. Urban voters represent
the modern equivalent of an insular and discrete minority and thus should
be treated as such for the purposes of judicial review.

183

See Dorf, supra note 154 (“[E]lected officials from New York and other high-tax states pointed out
that the high-tax states also tend to be net-donor states–that is, they get back less in federal
investment than they contribute through taxes–while the lower-tax states tend to be net-recipient
states.”).
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B. Federalism/Republicanism Concerns
The Constitution originally sought to balance power between free and
slave regions in an agricultural economy.184 However, in an urbanized era
where a few areas produce the majority of the wealth and tax revenue, this
gives voters in rural states an outsized influence.185 For example, America’s
scheme of representation allowed President Trump to seize power with a
minority of votes (he lost the popular vote by nearly three million votes) from
areas that constitute just 36% of the economy.186 Today’s Electoral College
ensures that a voter in Wyoming has over three times the clout in a
presidential election as a voter in California, and both states receive the same
number of senators.187 This differential allowed President Trump to carry
the election while largely ignoring, or even denigrating, urban voters.
The promise of a republican form of government was certainly integral
to the vision of the first founding, and there can be no doubt that the drafters
of the Constitution sought to protect counter-majoritarian rural interests by
structuring the Senate to give rural and agricultural states even weight to
more urban ones in the upper house of congress. However, the Framers did
not envision political parties as powerful as they are today, let alone that the
urban-rural divide would fall as sharply along political party lines. They
certainly did not envision sophisticated gerrymandering, unlimited campaign
donations, and career politicians who had limited incentive to respond to the
will of the people. Finally, the founders could not have envisioned the
distortion of the democratic process that has resulted from perverse antimajoritarian legislative rules such as the so-called Hastert rule, which
Speaker Boehner and Leader McConnell have relied upon over the past

184
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See Will Wilkinson, Why Do We Value Country Folk More Than City People?, N.Y. TIMES (June 27,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/opinion/republicans-democrats-trump-urbanrural.html [https://perma.cc/SJ2L-VX8V] (describing the America of the founding as “a
thoroughly agricultural economy”).
Mark Muro & Sifan Liu, Another Clinton-Trump Divide: High-Output America vs. Low-Output America,
BROOKINGS INST. (Nov. 29, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/2016/11/29/another-clinton-trump-divide-high-output-america-vs-low-outputamerica/?utm_campaign=Brookings+Brief&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_
content=38499796 [https://perma.cc/D528-QH2X].
Wilkinson, supra note 184.
See supra note 5; see also Justin Davidson, Cities vs. Trump: Red State, Blue State? The Urban-Rural Divide
Is More Significant, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 17, 2017), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2017/04/theurban-rural-divide-matters-more-than-red-vs-blue-state.html [https://perma.cc/W8GU-CLNK].

June 2022]

DEMOCRACY AND DEMOGRAPHY

801

decade to kill popular legislation.188 Under the Hastert rule, the leader in the
House and Senate can refuse to allow a vote to proceed on legislation unless
they are confident a majority of the majority backs that legislation.189 In
2013, this meant that comprehensive immigration reform passed the Senate
by a margin of 68–32 and the majority of the House also favored reform, but
Republican leadership would not hold a vote on the bill because the majority
of the House Republicans did not support it.190 More recently, the First Step
Act, which passed the Senate 87–12, was almost not brought to a vote by
Senator Mitch McConnell.191 All of these trends have hobbled democracy
and limited the ability of urban citizens to participate equally in the political
process.
In addition to the fact that demographic and political circumstances have
changed since the drafting of the Constitution, it is also important to
remember that the very nature of American federalism is simply different
from the way it was envisioned at the founding. In particular, what has been
called the second founding192—the combination of the Civil War and the
Reconstruction Amendments—radically reshaped the balance of power
between state and federal governments193 and empowered the federal
government to ensure the protection of structurally disempowered groups
against discrimination, particularly discrimination by more agricultural and
rural states. Thus, it is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees to
individual citizens protection from disempowering laws and policies enacted
with prejudice towards structurally disadvantaged groups, regardless of any
federalism considerations.
Of course, the Constitution, even the reconstructed one, still leaves to the
states the prerogative of determining the boundaries of legislative districts
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190
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Wilkinson, supra note 184.
See, e.g., Tara Golshan, The “Hastert Rule,” the Reason a DACA Deal Could Fail in the House, Explained,
VOX (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/1/24/16916898/hastertrule-daca-could-fail-house-ryan [https://perma.cc/HMV3-3G3W].
Wilkinson, supra note 184.
See Andrew Kragie, Mitch McConnell Appears to Be Killing Bipartisan Sentencing Reform, THE ATLANTIC
(Dec. 9, 2018,) https://nypost.com/2018/12/09/mcconnells-making-a-big-mistake-by-refusingto-let-first-step-pass/ [https://perma.cc/2GFB-GRWN].
See, e.g., ERIC FONER, THE SECOND FOUNDING: HOW THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION
REMADE THE CONSTITUTION (2019).
See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Constitution, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 47,48
(1995) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment fundamentally changed the nature of American
self-government).
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used at both the state and federal level, through the process of redistricting.
However, the increasing strength of political parties, the extreme residential
segregation of the population along partisan lines, and the advance of new
technology has allowed for unprecedented and sophisticated
gerrymandering that deliberately aims to dilute the power of urban voters
during the redistricting process.194 Today, gerrymandering is a multimilliondollar business with highly paid and highly sought-after political consultants,
armies of lawyers, terabytes of data about voters, sophisticated software, and
supercomputers. This technology allows politicians, with relative ease, to
spread their members throughout a state in such a way as to achieve a
majority in as many districts as possible while simultaneously concentrating
supporters of the opposing party in as few districts as possible.
When voters are “cracked and packed”195 in this manner, one party can
win a majority of district elections while commanding a smaller share of the
vote overall. As a result of partisan-gerrymandering, more than 75% of
districts are uncompetitive, with margins of victory greater than ten
percentage points.196 To understand the power of partisan gerrymandering,
particularly with the help of modern technology, take for example the
redistricting that occurred following the 2010 census. In May 2018, the
Center for American Progress found that gerrymandered congressional
districts shifted an average fifty-nine seats in the U.S. House of
Representatives during the 2012, 2014, and 2016 elections. This means that,
solely because of gerrymandering, the lower house of Congress—which the
Constitution commits to being representative of the population—has on
average fifty-nine members who would not have been elected but for
gerrymandering. Accordingly, over one-tenth of the representative body of
Congress won their elections simply because the borders of the districts
where they were competing were drawn in a way to ensure their advantage.
Remarkably, the number of gerrymandered partisan districts described

194

195

196

Vann R. Newkirk II, How Redistricting Became a Technological Arm’s Race, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 28.,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/10/gerrymandering-technologyredmap-2020/543888/ [https://perma.cc/KVL2-FZ7N].
See Olga Pierce, Jeff Larson & Lois Beckett, Redistricting, a Devil’s Dictionary, PRO PUBLICA (Nov. 2,
2011), https://www.propublica.org/article/redistricting-a-devils-dictionary
[https://perma.cc/XT9Q-S9A4] (defining the process of “cracking” and “packing”).
COMM. FOR ECON.DEV. OF THE CONF. BOARD, Let the Voters Choose: Solving the Problem of Partisan
Gerrymandering (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.ced.org/reports/solving-the-problem-of-partisangerrymandering [https://perma.cc/P2FB-QULZ].
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above is greater than the number of total districts allotted to California, the
largest state in the country, which has fifty-three House members
representing a population of nearly forty million people.197
We can see the same problem with regard to state legislative districts. In
Wisconsin, for example, 1.3 million voters backed a Democrat for the state
legislature in 2018, compared to 1.1 million ballots for Republicans.198
Nevertheless, the GOP still managed to retain its 63–36 supermajority in the
Assembly and actually even increased its majority in the state Senate.199
Likewise, in Michigan more people voted for Democratic candidates, yet
Republicans maintained an edge in both houses.200 Indeed, Michigan
Democrats have won more total votes for the state House in four consecutive
elections without it translating into a majority.201 Meanwhile, in the state
Senate Democrats won 50.4% of the votes, but Republicans won 58% of the
seats.202 North Carolina’s legislature is similar. In 2018 Democrats received
51% of the vote, but only 45% of the seats.203 In Ohio, Democrats won 48%
of the vote, up over 5% from the last election, but earned zero new seats.204
Republicans ultimately held 75% of the seats despite earning only 52% of
the vote.205 Finally, this same problem is beginning to be replicated in state
judicial elections. For example, the gerrymandered, Republican-controlled,
state legislature in Pennsylvania is seeking to change state law so that
elections for State Supreme Court justice will be conducted by legislative
district rather than on a statewide basis, which would allow the Republican
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Alex Tausanovitch, The Impact of Partisan Gerrymandering, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 1, 2019),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/news/2019/10/01/475166/impactpartisan-gerrymandering/ [https://perma.cc/8NVQ-C4B6].
David Daley, It Will Take Many, Many More Blue Waves to Undo the GOP’s 2010 Power Grab,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Nov. 14, 2018), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/cafe/it-will-takemany-many-more-blue-waves-to-undo-the-gops-2010-power-grab [https://perma.cc/JHP6FMTM].
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minority to bootstrap into the judiciary the same locked-in partisan
gerrymandered power they have already created in the legislature.206
The U.S. Supreme Court has described gerrymandering as principally
about “partisan” politics rather than racial animus and has therefore placed
such practices outside of close judicial scrutiny.207 However, the effect of this
interpretation is to insulate from challenge race-based gerrymandering, so
long as legislators use only partisan terms to describe their efforts. Given the
racially polarized electorate, however, these goals are indistinguishable as a
practical matter, and legislatures across the country have been chastened
sufficiently to avoid openly discussing race when a focus on partisan
affiliation has the same impact but is protected from judicial oversight.208 It
is, of course, not only Republicans who engage in partisan
gerrymandering,209 but it is primarily a tool employed by the shrinking
Republican party to ensure minority rule for years to come. Moreover, it
has the ultimate effect of disenfranchising millions of urban voters who are
packed into a smaller number of districts, thereby deliberately diluting their
voting power. And, of course, the problem is compounded when these
gerrymandered legislatures then enact laws that aim to suppress the vote of
urban majorities still further. In the face of such extreme entrenched partisan
assaults on majoritarian democracy, a mere invocation of federalism or
republicanism cannot suffice to shield the efforts from constitutional scrutiny.
C. The Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine poses another potential obstacle to courts
playing the sort of robust democracy-protecting role we envision. This
prudential doctrine is frequently justified by courts as necessary so as to
prevent unelected judges from encroaching on the domains of the more
politically accountable branches of government.
The judiciary is
understandably reluctant to render outcome-determinative judgments in
206
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See Patrick Berry, The Wrong Way to Reform Judicial Elections, BRENNAN CTR FOR JUST. (Feb. 7, 2020),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/wrong-way-reform-judicialelections [https://perma.cc/9DDK-EB72].
Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2502 (2019).
See Scott Lemieux, In a Divided America, Partisan and Race-Based Redistricting Are Indistinguishable, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/nov/12/
partisan-race-based-redistricting-supreme-court-alabama [https://perma.cc/DNW9-ZZPJ].
See, e.g., Benisek v. Lamone, 348 F. Supp. 3d 493, 497 (D. Md. 2018) (gerrymandering suit
brought by members of the Republican party against Democrats from their state).
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cases where the people should be making such determinations through the
ordinary political courses available to them.
However, this rationale makes no sense when it is precisely those
politically accountable branches that have deliberately insulated themselves
from true accountability by entrenching their power. Indeed, as discussed
throughout this Article, in such circumstances the political process has
fundamentally broken down, and the judiciary must intervene to ensure that
politics can function. Thus, there is absolutely no justification for using the
political question doctrine to sidestep cases that are challenging the
legitimacy of the political process itself.
Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court must, at its first opportunity,
overrule its decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, in which the Court held that
politically motivated gerrymandering is a non-justiciable political
question.210 As discussed throughout, politically motivated gerrymandering
is clearly justiciable under traditional equal protection principles, and courts
are not only empowered but required to intervene in order to ensure that the
political process can function. Indeed, the whole rationale behind the
political question doctrine is nonsensical if courts are deferring to a political
process that is deliberately rigged to make meaningful political participation
impossible. Absent court intervention, a distinct group of urban and
suburban voters, primarily composed of racial minorities, face mounting
structural barriers to engaging in the political process at all.
The lack of political accountability that accompanies structural
entrenchment of power hurts not only those who are excluded, but it blocks
the political feedback loop that is supposed to operate in a democracy. In
order to see the problem, consider contemporary politics. In a normal
democratic feedback loop, one would expect a political party that has lost the
popular vote in seven out of eight elections to adjust its platform or rhetoric
in order to become more attractive to a larger proportion of the population.
But that is not happening currently because Republicans understand that
they do not need to win a majority of the population in order to win elections.
Likewise, because of gerrymandering, most members of Congress (and state
legislatures) are in “safe” seats, and they therefore need only appeal to their
own party’s voters in order to win the primary election. In such
circumstances, the political process has broken down, and there is no
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effective accountability mechanism. Therefore, refusing to intervene
because courts should defer to the political process is completely purposeless.
As one commentator has pointed out, our current problem as a country “isn’t
too much polarization, it’s too little democracy.”211
Moreover, the political question doctrine cannot be invoked simply
because the subject of the suit has something to do with voting. To the
contrary, Baker v. Carr,212 the case that comprehensively set forth the Court’s
six-factor test for political questions,213 was itself a voting case, and the Court
determined that the redistricting question at issue was in fact justiciable.
Since then, the Court has addressed controversies surrounding legislative
apportionment, including but not limited to inequities in population between
districts, under the Equal Protection Clause.214 Indeed, it was through these
cases that the Court articulated and enforced the “one person, one vote”
standard. The Court has also made clear that even when a legislative
apportionment scheme does not violate “one person, one vote,” redistricting
plans that intentionally diminish the voting power of a suspect class also
violate the Equal Protection Clause.215 In this vein, the Court considered
under the Equal Protection Clause whether a New York redistricting plan
that split a Hasidic Jewish community in two in order to create majority-
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Ezra Klein, The Crisis Isn’t Too Much Polarization. It’s Too Little Democracy, VOX (Nov. 12, 2020),
https://www.vox.com/21561011/2020-election-joe-biden-donald-trump-electoral-college-votesenate-democracy [https://perma.cc/ZE66-3SZC].
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 217 ( laying out six factors for evaluating whether a case presents a non-justiciable political
question: “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving
it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual
need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”).
See Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120 (2016); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Shaw v.
Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412
U.S. 735 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (explaining that re-districting plans can be in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause if such plans are racially motivated); Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 67 (1980) (explaining that when there is purposeful discrimination in a redistricting
scheme there can be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
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minority districts constituted unlawful racial discrimination.216 The Court
later held that multimember districts that “operate to minimize or cancel out
the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population”
would also raise justiciable constitutional questions.217
Based on this line of cases, the Court decided, in Davis v. Bandemer,218 that
political gerrymandering cases are justiciable under the Equal Protection
Clause. But the justices in Bandemer could not agree on a standard by which
politically motivated gerrymandering claims were to be assessed for
constitutionality. The plurality decision held that a political gerrymandering
claim could succeed only when a plaintiff demonstrates both intent to
discriminate against a particular group and that the proposed plan has actual
discriminatory effect.
Almost two decades later, in Veith v. Jubelirer,219 the Court again could not
achieve a majority rationale, but Justice Scalia, writing for the plurality,
found that the lack of a discernable and manageable standard for
adjudicating cases concerning politically motivated gerrymandering claims
required such claims to be deemed nonjusticiable. Justice Scalia found that
the plurality’s standard in Bandemer—that a plaintiff show “both intentional
discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group”—was not manageable because in
practice, the effects prong was difficult to determine and “fairness” created
no meaningful guidepost for the Courts, while political “proportionality” is
nowhere guaranteed in our constitutional system.220 Moreover, Justice
Scalia reasoned, the Constitution provides a remedy for political
gerrymandering by giving the Congress the power to “make or alter”
216
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United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 152 (1977). The Court
stated in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412, U.S. 735, 751 (1973) that “[a] districting plan may create
multimember districts perfectly acceptable under equal population standards, but invidiously
discriminatory because they are employed ‘to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or political elements of the voting population.’” Id. (upholding against an equal protection
challenge a state legislative single-member redistricting scheme that was formulated in a
bipartisan effort to give political parties proportional political representation in the State); see also
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 756 (1973) (exploring whether “multimember districts provided
for [two] [c]ounties were properly found to have been invidiously discriminatory against
cognizable racial or ethnic groups in those counties.”); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 127
(1971) (exploring whether specific redistricting was in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).
Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1986).
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
Vieth v. Jubelirer 541 U.S. 267 (2004).
Id. at 278–80 (plurality opinion).
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gerrymandered districts.221 Of course, this is an empty remedy because
Congress, and the very congressional candidates who have long benefited
from political gerrymandering, have not and will not step in to remedy the
challenge to democratic political process. Justice Kennedy, in his
concurrence, rejected Scalia’s political question conclusion, but agreed that
in the particular case at hand plaintiffs’ claims failed.
In Rucho v. Common Cause,222 the Roberts Court essentially adopted Justice
Scalia’s position, abrogated Bandemer, and held that partisan
gerrymandering—no matter how egregious—presents a non-justiciable
political question that cannot ever be addressed by the federal courts.
According to the 5–4 majority, there cannot be a sufficiently manageable
standard for the judiciary to distinguish between a constitutional and an
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.
The majority reached this
conclusion despite voluminous social science data presented in the case to
illustrate just how extreme the districts at issue were and how much they
diluted Black urban votes.223
However, as Justice Kagan articulated in her dissent, political
gerrymandering implicates the Fourteenth Amendment because, as the
Court has long recognized, the Equal Protection Clause guarantees “the
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election” of legislators,
a function that political gerrymandering denies minority voters.224
Moreover, the appropriate standard for the Court “does not use any judgemade conception of electoral fairness—either proportional representation or
any other; instead, it takes as its baseline a State’s own criteria of fairness,
apart from partisan gain. . . . and invalidates the most extreme, but only the
most extreme, partisan gerrymanders.”225
The Court’s precedent should have dictated the opposite result, and the
Ely/Carolene Products political process doctrine supplies the rationale: the
affected party is a discrete and insular minority (or even majority) that
currently faces insurmountable obstacles in attaining even roughly
proportional representation or meaningful political efficacy. In addition, as
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Id. at 275 (plurality opinion).
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506 (2019) (“We conclude that partisan gerrymandering claims present political
questions beyond the reach of the federal courts.”).
See generally Common Cause v. Rucho, 318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964).
Rucho, 139 S.Ct. at 2516 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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this article has argued, there is little meaningful difference between partisan
gerrymandering and race-based gerrymandering. They have the same effect
and, for many legislators, the same purpose.
Finally, of course, even if the Court continues to deem gerrymandering
cases nonjusticiable political questions, that would have no impact on the
various other sorts of cases discussed in this Article, where the legislature or
executive enact substantive policies designed to target and harm urban and
suburban populations or deny them the ability to meaningfully participate in
the political process. Such cases would not be governed by Rucho and
therefore could be decided independent from the gerrymandering line of
cases.
D. The “Independent State Legislature” Theory
For all the reasons previously discussed in this Article, robust judicial
oversight to protect American democracy has perhaps never been more
important. Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court may be poised to move
in the opposite direction. Four justices have recently signaled their potential
willingness to embrace an obscure and implausible constitutional theory that
could prevent federal judges from reviewing any state voting laws, even
those that target specific groups or ignore democratic processes altogether.
Still worse, this theory would go so far as to block state judges interpreting
their own state constitutions from doing so. It would even prevent the
voters of a state from passing democracy-protecting ballot initiatives.
Needless to say, such an outcome would be catastrophic for the future
of democracy in America.
The theory in question has been dubbed the “independent state
legislature” theory,226 and it derives from a wooden ahistorical reading of the
words of Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution: “The Times, Places
and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of
choosing Senators.”227 Applying this language, so the argument goes, state
226
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Michael T. Morley, The Independent State Legislature Doctrine, Federal Elections, and State Constitutions, 55
GA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2020) (“[T]he doctrine teaches that a state constitution is legally incapable of
imposing substantive restrictions on the authority over federal elections that the U.S. Constitution
confers directly upon a state’s legislature.”).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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legislatures possess the sole authority to prescribe rules for congressional
elections, largely free from any constraints that might be placed on the
legislatures by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as well
as state courts, state constitutions, or even the state’s voters themselves.228
Likewise, proponents point to Article II, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution
which provides that in presidential elections—“each State shall appoint, in
such manner as the legislature thereof may direct” the electors to which the
State is entitled.229 If taken literally, this clause can be read to allow state
legislatures to ignore the popular vote in the state altogether and name
representatives to the Electoral College that match the legislature’s
preferences, again regardless of what even the state’s own constitution might
require.230
For now, the theory does not seem to be embraced by a majority of the
U.S. Supreme Court, which recently rejected attempts by Republicans in
Pennsylvania and North Carolina to block new congressional maps drawn
by the supreme courts of those states.231 However, there may be at least four
votes for the theory. In a statement accompanying the Court’s refusal to fasttrack a Republican challenge to the 2020 vote-counting process in
Pennsylvania, Justice Alito, joined by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, opined
that the federal Constitution conferred “on state legislatures, not state courts,
the authority to make rules governing federal elections.”232 Subsequently, in
a case involving a federal judge’s COVID-19-related modifications to
election rules in Wisconsin, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh stated that,
“the Constitution provides that state legislatures—not federal judges, not
state judges, not state governors, not other state officials—bear primary
responsibility for setting election rules.”233 Most recently, Justice Alito,
joined again by Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, dissented from the denial of
the Republican request for a stay application in the North Carolina
redistricting case, calling the independent state legislature theory an issue of
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See Morley, supra note 226, at 8–10.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 3.
See Morley, supra note 226, at 8–10.
See Moore v. Harper, 142 S. Ct. 1089 (2022) (North Carolina case) (denying emergency stay
application); Toth v. Chapman, 142 S. Ct. 1355 (2022) (Pennsylvania case) (denying emergency
application for writ of injunction).
Republican Party of Pa. v. Kathy Boockvar, 141 S. Ct. 1 (2020) (Statement of Alito, J.).
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Wis. State Legislature, 141 S. Ct. 28, 29 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., joined by
Kavanaugh, J., concurring in denial of application to vacate stay).
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“great national importance.”234 Justice Kavanaugh largely agreed, stating,
“I agree with Justice Alito that the underlying elections clause question raised
in the emergency application is important, and that both sides have advanced
serious arguments on the merits. The issue is almost certain to keep arising
until the court definitively resolves it.”235 Thus, four justices appear open to
entertaining this doctrine as a potential limitation on judicial review of
legislative efforts to change election rules, even if those rules potentially
disenfranchise a majority of the state’s population.
As scholars have pointed out, this reading of the constitutional text, is
almost completely indefensible,236 and it is not surprising that none of the
justices entertaining it was able to offer any historical, structural, or
precedential justification for it, other than their own literalist reading of the
text.
The reasons to reject the theory are myriad. First, it rests on the idea that
a state legislature, which is, after all, a creature of the state constitution, is not
itself subject to the provisions of that same constitution. Yet, the whole idea
of judicial review is that the judiciary has a duty to check whether the
legislature is acting within its constitutional powers. Thus, “[w]hen state
jurists attend to the state constitution in interpreting state election statutes,
these judges are enforcing Article II, not undermining it.”237
Second, granting this sort of talismanic power to the word “legislature”
in these provisions is precisely the kind of wooden literalism that gives
textualism a bad name. As former Scalia clerk and now Justice Amy Coney
Barrett has made clear, good textually-based analysis is not the same thing
as literalism.238 Indeed, as she has argued, “textual literalism . . . would lead
to absurd results.”239 Here, such absurdity arises from using the bare word
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U.L. REV. 731 (2001) (disputing doctrine’s historical underpinnings ).
Amar & Amar, supra note 236, at 10.
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“legislature” to conclude that the framers of the U.S. Constitution intended
to draw a distinction between the State that is empowered to appoint electors
and that State’s legislature.240 This is akin to interpreting the word
“Congress” in the First Amendment to mean that the First Amendment does
not apply to the executive branch of government. Given that such a limited
reading is unsupported by the history or structure of the U.S. Constitution,
there is no justification for such literalism, particularly in light of the historical
understanding of the word “legislature” at the time. As Akhil & Vikram
Amar have noted, “The public meaning of state ‘legislature’ was clear and
well accepted at the Founding: A state’s ‘legislature’ was not just an entity
created to represent the people; it was an entity created and constrained by the state
constitution.”241
Indeed, adopting the independent state legislature theory would not only
fly in the face of the history and structure of the U.S. Constitution; it also is
directly contrary to a 2015 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which
specifically stated that “‘the meaning of the word “legislature,” used several
times in the federal Constitution, differs according to the connection in which
it is employed, depend[ent] upon the character of the function which that
body in each instance is called upon to exercise.’”242 Accordingly, the Court
ruled that the use of an independent redistricting commission was permissible
despite the “legislature” language in Article 2 because the commission had
been authorized by the voters of the state through a ballot initiative adopted
pursuant to the state constitution.
Third, preventing even state judges from reviewing legislative action
under their state constitutions would completely undermine the Court’s 2019
ruling in Rucho v. Common Cause.243 As discussed above, in that case the Court
determined that federal courts could not adjudicate issues of partisan
gerrymandering because they are political questions. However, the majority
opinion explicitly pointed out that its ruling applied only to federal courts
and that state courts may be better equipped to handle such questions.244
Indeed, according to the Court, because “[t]he States . . . are actively
240
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addressing the issue on a number of fronts,” avenues of judicial review to
correct partisan gerrymandering would continue to exist, just at the state
level.245 This suggestion led many commentators to look to state constitutions
as a viable path to address partisan gerrymandering.246 However, if the
Court were to adopt the independent state legislature doctrine, it would shut
down the very avenue it proposed when it found that federal courts should
stay out of the political thicket of partisan gerrymandering.
Finally, as to federal judges, for all the reasons discussed in this Article,
even if state legislatures possess some authority with regard to the conduct of
elections, that authority surely cannot be exercised in a way that violates
other provisions of the U.S. Constitution, such as the Fourteenth
Amendment. Indeed, even the per curiam opinion in the much reviled Bush
v. Gore decision was grounded in the idea that Florida’s recount procedures
violated the Equal Protection Clause.247 Thus, if a state legislature effectively
substitutes its judgment for the will of the people by setting up election rules
and procedures to systematically disenfranchise specific populations, such
rules must be invalidated under the theory of popular democratic
participation articulated in Carolene Products footnote four and subsequent
Equal Protection cases. And this is particularly appropriate if the legislature
in question has itself been gerrymandered so that it effectively represents only
a minority of the state’s population.
The stakes in this debate could hardly be higher. Currently, the U.S.
Supreme Court sits on the precipice of upending settled tenets of American
representative democracy as some justices contemplate removing entirely all
state and federal judicial oversight concerning federal elections. Meanwhile,
Republican-dominated state legislatures—many of which are the product of
gerrymandering to give outsized influence to rural populations in their
states—are passing laws that severely restrict voting. According to one study,
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in 2021 nine states enacted twelve bills that take aim at state courts for their
role in ensuring access to vote.248 They do so by making it more difficult for
judges to extend how long the polls are open (Georgia), prohibiting judges
from suspending state election laws (Kansas, Kentucky, and Texas), and
changing how judges are selected, limiting which courts will hear cases
involving the state, or making it easier to target state court judges for
unpopular decisions. (Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, Ohio, and
Tennessee).249 Even more dangerous, after the 2020 election, in service of
the Big Lie, the GOP in Wisconsin introduced legislation to divide up the
electoral votes by deeply gerrymandered congressional districts rather than
by a popular vote.250 And states are considering bills that would allow the
state legislature to intervene in presidential elections and pick electors if the
results are deemed “unclear.”251 Under such a scheme, state legislatures, not
the people, would choose the outcome of elections, thereby undermining
democracy entirely. Yet, under the independent state legislature theory,
there would be little room for state or federal judges to interpose either state
or federal constitutional constraints on such blatantly anti-democratic
schemes.
Instead, state judges must recognize that the legislature only operates—
and historically has only ever operated—within the constraints of the state
constitution, and both state and federal judges must take seriously the idea
that the federal Equal Protection Clause protects not just the right to be free
from racial gerrymandering and a poll tax, but also the process of tabulating
and counting votes itself. State legislatures that substitute their will for the
will of the voters are subject to strict scrutiny because they are tampering
with the very foundation of democratic participation itself.
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CONCLUSION
The demographic and political realities of the United States in the
twenty-first century combine to threaten the long-term viability of
majoritarian democracy. Our political process has been hijacked by a
minority faction that is using its structurally entrenched power to lock in its
continued ability to govern, despite not commanding the support of anything
close to a majority of Americans. This is an existential crisis requiring a
response from every independent source of power in society.
The judiciary, because it is insulated from the day-to-day exigencies of
partisan politics, must play an active role in righting the political balance and
resisting counter-majoritarian entrenchment and discrimination by this
minority faction. Once upon a time, the U.S. Supreme Court took its role
as guardian of the political process seriously. As John Hart Ely recognized,
the Court created an entire jurisprudence from the Carolene Products footnote,
subjecting to heightened scrutiny legislative or executive enactments that
were the product of discrimination against politically powerless groups or
that made it impossible for the political process to operate effectively.
Recognizing that some groups were being systematically excluded from
meaningful participation in the democracy, the Court worked to counteract
partisan and discriminatory entrenchment.
Today, urban and suburban populations are similarly being blocked from
full participation in our democracy commensurate with their numbers. Yet,
the problem is perhaps even worse in this century than the last because it is
not a discrete and insular minority being disenfranchised, but the majority of
Americans. Meanwhile, Republican presidents and members of Congress
are not disciplined by democratic accountability because they need only
appeal to their base, not a majority of voters. This state of affairs cannot
continue for long without the country breaking apart. It simply cannot be
that as the country grows ever more diverse and urban a small rural, mostly
white, minority can continue to maintain a structural chokehold on
American politics.
In the end, the long-term legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court depends
on its willingness to re-engage in the political process to ensure that blockages
to that process are removed and that any legislation or executive action that
deliberately disadvantages urban and suburb populations is subjected to
heightened scrutiny. And it must also stay out of the way and not interfere
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with state judges using state constitutions to protect democracy. Such actions
do not require courts to pontificate on fairness or interfere to ensure complete
proportionality; only that judges step in to address areas in which the
ordinary methods of effectuating political will are not available as a result of
intentional entrenchment and discrimination. State and federal judicial
intervention of this sort will not subvert democracy but enhance it by
ensuring that the political process allows for meaningful participation and
therefore meaningful accountability.

